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Abstract
We analyse direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) in the pre-
scription drug market, when a regulator imposes a ne for mislead-
ing advertisements (truth-in-advertising regulation) and doctors face
pressure to contain prescribing costs. The e¢ cacy of a drug is based
on scientic evidence as well as on patient-specic characteristics.
Patients do not possess information on either dimension of e¢ cacy.
Pharmaceutical rms observe the scientic data and use DTCA to
convey this information to patients. Doctors observe both the scien-
tic data and patient-specic characteristics, and provide treatment
recommendations. We develop a model in which DTCA is followed by
a doctor-patient signalling game. We show that truth-in-advertising
regulation increases the credibility of DTCA and may increase both
doctor-patient conict and prescriptions for an expensive new drug
a market stealing e¤ect. Tighter regulation may encourage more
DTCA, and may even encourage more false advertising.
1 Introduction
The marketing of ethical medicines is a highly regulated activity. In the U.S.
direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) must restrict statements to veriable
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facts and only promote the use of the drug for approved indications (Dan-
zon and Keu¤el, 2014). However, DTCA remains controversial, and episodes
such as the withdrawal of Vioxx have amplied calls for tightening of the
regulation of DTCA. Vioxx was amongst the most heavily advertised prod-
ucts in the market (Bradford et al., 2006) but was later found to have fatal
side-e¤ects leading to large-scale mortality (Vaithianathan et al., 2009). Its
rapid take-up was partly blamed on intensive marketing campaigns, prompt-
ing calls for tighter regulations and better enforcement of truth-in-advertising
rules (U.S. General Accounting O¢ ce, 2002; Donohue, Cevasco and Rosen-
thal, 2007; Shuchman, 2007).
An open question is whether increased regulation or monitoring will dis-
cipline advertisers as intended. Nelson (1974) pointed out that truth-in-
advertising regulation may have the perverse e¤ect of encouraging more ad-
vertising, since regulation enhances the credibility and therefore the value
of advertisements. Sauer and Le­ er (1990) found some empirical support
for Nelsons hypothesis. However, Nelson does not consider markets with
learned intermediarieswho might contradict the advertised message.
The present paper develops a signalling model in which a patient consults
a physician about whether to take a new drug after observing DTCA. The
patients treatment decision is based on what they infer from DTCA as well
as the doctors recommendation. Drug advertising is randomly audited for
truthfulness.
We assume that physicians face pressure to limit prescribing of expensive
new drugs as in a managed care environment so physicians are imperfect
agents of their patients. Nevertheless, in the absence of DTCA, patients
comply with their physicians suggested treatments. Advertising changes
equilibrium behaviour in the physician-patient consultation by encouraging
the patient to challenge a physician who recommends against the advertised
drug. In the model, DTCA distorts the physicians recommendation towards
the advertised drug and also leads to greater levels of conict with patients.
Our model therefore illustrates one possible mechanism by which DTCA
might facilitatemarket stealing shifting demand to the advertised brand. It
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is also consistent with empirical evidence on the detrimental e¤ects of DTCA
on patient-physician trust, particularly in a managed care or HMO setting
(Kravitz et al., 2005; Spence et al., 2005).
We examine two types of market-stealing equilibria in detail: one in which
all advertising is truthful, and another in which some advertising is false.
Although we do not characterise all equilibria of the model, our results are
nevertheless general in the following sense: if DTCA is used in equilibrium,1
then the level of prescribing of the advertised drug will be higher than under
a scenario in which DTCA is banned.
There have been a number of empirical studies of the e¤ects of DTCA
on prescribing (e.g., Berndt et al., 1995, 1997; Calfee, Winston and Stemp-
ski, 2002; Iizuka, 2004; Iizuka and Jin, 2005; Ling, Berndt and Kyle, 2002;
Rosenthal et al., 2003). The evidence suggests that DTCA can be e¤ective in
increasing own-brand demand. Narayanan, Desiraju and Chintagunta (2004)
and Kalyanaram (2008, 2009) nd that DTCA increased the market share
of the advertised drug. Wosinska (2002) also nds a market stealing e¤ect of
DTCA, but only when the drug is subsidised for the patient.
There is also evidence that this market-stealing e¤ect might work by en-
couraging patients to request the advertised medicine. Liu and Gupta (2011)
analyse prescribing data for patients newly diagnosed with hyperlipidemia,
and nd that DTCA has a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on pa-
tient requests for the advertised brand. In Kravitz et al. (2005) actors were
randomly assigned to make 298 unannounced visits to physicians. They
found that 37% of patients requesting a named brand received a prescription
for the drug, compared to 10% of patients who made a general drug request
and none of the patients who did not request any drugs. They conclude that
as long as DTCA can persuade patients to mention a brand, physicians can
be induced to change their prescribing decisions.
Previous theoretical analyses of DTCA have tended to focus on market
expansion e¤ects, rather than market stealing.
1More precisely still, in any restricted equilibrium as dened in the Supplementary
Material.
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Brekke and Kuhn (2006) analyse the interaction between DTCA, price
setting and detailing (marketing to physicians). They model DTCA as di-
rectly informative: consumers do not question the truthfulness of advertised
messages, and are prompted to visit their physicians by learning the adver-
tised information. By contrast, we assume that patients visit their physicians
whether or not they see DTCA, but our patients do not unquestioningly be-
lieve the content of DTCA. Our model explains why DTCA may persuade
consumers to switch drugs, despite their rational incredulity and the inter-
mediation by physicians. In Brekke and Kuhn, it is detailing that drives the
prescribing decision, which is made by the physician. There is no detailing
in our model (though this an obvious avenue for further research), and pa-
tients have sovereignty over the prescribing decision. The exercise of this
sovereignty is limited, however, by the need to pay a conict costto reject
the physicians recommendation.
Rubin and Schrag (1999) likewise treat DTCA as directly informative.
Intensity of advertising increases brand awareness, which in turn encourages
the HMO to place the drug on its formulary. Rubin and Schrag show that
tighter regulation, which imposes higher compliance costs on the advertiser,
can have ambiguous e¤ects if DTCA is a strategic complement to price.
With higher-cost advertising, the drug company advertises less and charges
a lower price. This reduces awareness amongst consumers but the lower price
increases consumption amongst the brand-aware consumers.
Neither of these papers addresses the credibility of DTCA or the regula-
tion of content.
We explore the e¤ect of truth-in-advertising regulation the frequency of
auditing and the penalties for false advertising on the incentive to advertise.
Stricter regulation may increase the credibility of DTCA and may therefore
lead to increased DTCA and more physician-patient conict. Stricter regu-
lation may even help to support false advertising. Our paper therefore chal-
lenges the presumption that tighter, or better enforced, truth-in-advertising
rules are e¤ective mechanisms for reducing the harmful e¤ects of DTCA.
A critical assumption of our model is that physicians are imperfect agents
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of their patients. Physicians employed by an HMO or managed care organ-
isation may face cost-containment mechanisms such as utilisation reviews,
capitation of provider payments and selective contracting with providers, all
of which challenge the physicians autonomy and reduce the emphasis on
maximising health gain. They may therefore be less inclined to prescribe
expensive new drugs than their patients would like.2 Domino and Salkever
(2003), for example, nd that physicians in an HMO setting are less likely
to prescribe expensive anti-depressants. Wynia et al. (2003) found that a
substantial proportion of doctors covered by managed care admitted to not
mentioning e¤ective services to patients when these services were not covered.
There is also evidence that patients are well aware of the pressures under
which doctors operate. Schlesinger (2002) reports the results of interviews
with a sample (n = 1; 527) of randomly selected patients about their faith in
the medical profession. Half of the respondents agreed with the statement
that doctors no longer place your well-being above concerns about health
care costs. Kao et al. (1998) surveyed 2,086 enrollees in a large insurer who
were distributed across fee-for-service and a variety of managed care plans.
They found that patients under the managed care schemes were statistically
signicantly less likely to trust their physicians to put their health ahead of
costs.
Patients in managed care schemes therefore face two biased sources of
information: the producers of expensive new drugs and their own physicians.
This complicates the patients treatment decision, but creates an opportunity
for drug producers to o¤set managed care pressure against prescribing their
2Under the Medicaid fail rstregime, doctors are required to try a cheaper drug rst,
while some drugs require the doctor to complete paper work and obtain prior approval
to prescribe. With the advent of Medicare Part D, Medicare beneciaries can also enrol
in HMO-type arrangements which include prescription drugs. The share of drugs with
utilisation management requirements amongst these type of plans increased from 18%
in 2007 to 28% in 2011, with prior authorisation being the most pervasive management
strategy. Prior authorisation imposes costs on doctors (Epling, Mader and Morley, 2014)
and encourages them to switch their prescribing to drugs for which prior authorisation is
not needed (Law et al., 2010).
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products. Because the drug producers bias is in the opposite direction to
that of the physician, there is scope for DTCA to be e¤ective in persuading
the patient to insist on the new drug, even if this means going against his
physicians advice.
2 The model
A population of patients is being treated for a chronic condition and regularly
visit their physicians.3 Patients have a common von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) utility function which depends on health, the level of any co-payments
and the level of conict with the doctor.4 Each patient is currently being
treated with generic drug , but a new, patented medication  has just been
introduced to the market.
All agents, including patients, are aware of the existence of  and the
conditions that it is designed to treat5 but are uninformed about its e¢ cacy.
The latter is determined by:
(i) The average quality of , as revealed by the randomized controlled trial
(RCT) data. This is known to both the pharmaceutical rm and the
physician.
(ii) Patient-specic factors which determine the quality of the match be-
tween the patient and the drug. These are ascertained by a medical
examination, so are known only to the physician.
For a given patient, the e¢ cacy of drug  is indexed by the state s 2
S = [s; 1], where s < 0. The state determines the additional health gain
from taking  rather than  (net of any co-payment for drug ), expressed
3According to the U.S. General Accounting O¢ ce (2002), all of the 15 most heavily
advertised drugs in 2000 were treatments for chronic conditions.
4A precise specication of utility is given below.
5We exclude brand awareness as a motivation for DTCA. This is often established
through media campaigns (Cassels et al., 2003).
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in vNM utils. The state is unobserved by the patient, but is known to the
physician at the time of consultation.
3 The consultation game
We rst describe a physician-patient consultation game in which the patient
visits the physician for a drug recommendation.
At the time of consultation, the patient has prior beliefs over S described
by the distribution function F . Later we introduce advertising by pharma-
ceutical rms, in which case F will incorporate anything the patient has
inferred about drug quality from DTCA. For now, though, we take F as
given and explore what happens during the patient-doctor consultation.
We model this consultation process as a signalling game. Nature selects
the state s 2 S according to the distribution F . The physician (she)
observes the state and makes a recommendation r 2
n
^; ^
o
. Here, r = ^
denotes a recommendation of drug  and r = ^ a recommendation of drug
. The patient (he) observes the physicians recommendation, but not the
state, and chooses a treatment t 2 f; g.
The doctors strategy is a mapping d : S ! [0; 1], where d (s) is the
probability that r = ^ in state s. The patients strategy is a mapping
p :
n
^; ^
o
! [0; 1], where p (r) is the probability that t =  given rec-
ommendation r. Thus, strategies indicate the probability of recommend-
ing/choosing drug .
A conict occurs whenever the patients treatment choice is di¤erent
from the physicians recommendation. The doctor and patient su¤er some
disutility from conict (cd > 0 and cp > 0, respectively).
The patients vNM utility payo¤ is
up (r; t; s) =
(
v   I
h
r = ^
i
cp if t = 
v + s  I [r = ^] cp if t = 
where I [] denotes the indicator function and v is the treatment benet from
drug . Since payo¤s are expressed in vNM utils, our model imposes no
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particular risk attitude on patients.6
The doctors vNM utility payo¤ is :
ud (r; t; s) =
(
v   I
h
r = ^
i
cd if t = 
v + (s  )  I [r = ^] cd if t = 
The utility penalty  2 (0; 1), which is imposed when  is prescribed (t = ),
embodies the doctors bias against . Apart from this bias, the physicians
utility function reects altruistic preferences (or a competitive pressure to
maximise patient utility).
With these payo¤s, the physician is an imperfect agent of the patient.
When s 2 (0; ) the patient and physician disagree about the preferred
treatment: the patient would like  but the physician prefers the cheaper
alternative, . We assume that the patient understands the doctors incen-
tives; in particular, patients know the value of  .7
Since none of our results depends on the value of v, we set v = 0 hence-
forth.8 We also make the following:
6To clarify, imagine a patient who derives vNM utility u (H;M) from his level of health
H and his monetary wealth M . This function embodies the patients attitude to risk
in these two dimensions. We impose no restrictions on its curvature. Let   denote a
fundamentalstate space that summarises the relative health benet from taking  rather
than . Then H is a function of (; t), where  2   is the state and t 2 f; g is
the treatment; while M is a function of t. Moreover, H (; ) is constant in . Let
v = u (H (; ) ;M ()) be the vNM utility from treatment . We may therefore transform
the fundamentalstate space   into a our state space S by dening:
s () = u (H (; ) ;M ())   v
In other words, u (H (; ) ;M ()) = v + s (). We therefore dene the patients vNM
utility as v + s () less any conict cost (and drop the redundant reference to ). The
patients risk attitude is incorporated in the change of variable: the transformation of 
into s. This implies that the patients prior distribution (F ) over S will be a¤ected by his
risk attitude. However, once S and F are specied, risk attitude plays no further role in
the analysis.
7See the Introduction for a discussion of this assumption.
8Since S has an upper bound normalised to 1, setting v = 0 exhausts the allowable
normalisations of vNM utility.
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Assumption 1 The distribution F is continuous with support [!; 1] for some
! 2 [s; 0). It is strictly increasing on its support and satises F (!) = 0.
By an equilibriumof the consultation game, we shall mean a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) that satises the Intuitive Criterion (IC).9 To
simplify matters at least initially we focus on equilibria which are respon-
sive and state monotonic:
Denition 1 An equilibrium is responsive if the patient responds di¤er-
ently to each recommendation: p (^) 6= p

^

. Otherwise, the equilibrium
is non-responsive.
Denition 2 An equilibrium is state monotonic if d (s) is weakly in-
creasing in s. That is, if the probability of the doctor recommending drug 
is weakly increasing in s.
In a non-responsive equilibrium, the patient ignores the doctors recom-
mendation. One such equilibrium a Beta equilibrium is discussed below.
However, we shall set aside the non-responsive equilibria for now.
There is something obviously counter-intuitive about equilibria that vio-
late state monotonicity, though these too may exist. Proposition 2 implicitly
acknowledges them, but we do not give any explicit consideration to such
equilibria.
The following simple observation is useful for the analysis of responsive
equilibria:10
Lemma 1 Suppose r; r0 2
n
^; ^
o
, r 6= r0, and the patients strategy satis-
es p (r0) > p (r). Then there exists s 2 S such that the physicians
unique best response is r when s < s and r0 when s > s. If s 2 (s; 1)
the physician is indi¤erent about her recommendation in state s.
9Because of conict costs, the consultation signalling game is not of the cheap talk
variety, so the IC has bite in disciplining o¤-equilibrium beliefs.
10All proofs are in the Appendix.
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Suppose p (r0) > p (r), and let s be dened as in Lemma 1. If p
is part of a state monotonic equilibrium then we must have r0 = ^ and
r = ^. In such an equilibrium, the doctor recommends drug  in states
above s and recommends drug  in states below s. If s 2 (!; 1) then
both recommendations occur with strictly positive probability in equilibrium
(Assumption 1). In this case, p

^

is an optimal response given posterior
beliefs that condition F on [s; 1], and p (^) is optimal for posterior beliefs
that condition F on [s; s]. In particular, d (s) is irrelevant to the patients
optimal response, since s occurs with probability zero conditional on either
recommendation.
It turns out that there always exists such an equilibrium, and it is essen-
tially unique (in a sense made precise in Proposition 1). The nature of the
equilibrium depends on whether  lies above or below the following parame-
ter:
s = sup
(
s0 2 S

Z s0
s
(s  cp) dF (s)  0
)
(1)
Note that s > 0 by Assumption 1. The following lemma claries the role of
parameter s.
Lemma 2 Given s 2 (!; 1), the condition
1
F (s)
Z s
s
s dF (s)  cp (2)
is equivalent to s  s.
Condition (2) is necessary and su¢ cient for the patient to be willing to
accept recommendation ^ when his posterior beliefs condition F on [s; s]. If
  s the doctor can therefore safely recommend her preferred treatment in
every state.11 In particular, if recommendation ^ reveals to the patient that
the state lies in [s;  ], he is happy to choose t = . (He will certainly choose
t =  when recommendation ^ informs him that the state lies in [ ; 1].) On
the other hand, if recommendation r = ^ informs the patient that s 2 [s;  ]
11A similar result is obtained by Lanzi and Mathis (2007, Proposition 2).
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but  > s, the patient will reject the recommendation. In this case, the
physician cannot hope to get her own way in all states.
Proposition 1 There always exists a responsive and state monontonic equi-
librium with s (dened in Lemma 1) lying in (!; 1). If   s, then in any
such equilibrium:
s =  , p (^) = 0 and p

^

= 1 (3)
If  > s, then in any such equilibrium:
s = s, p (^) =
(   s)
(   s) + cd and 
p

^

= 1 (4)
We call an equilibrium satisfying (3) a physician knows best equilibrium
(PKBE). In any PKBE, the physician recommends her preferred treatment
in every state and the patient accepts either recommendation.
An equilibrium satisfying (4) is called a conict equilibrium (CE). In such
an equilibrium, the physician refrains from recommending drug  in states
above s, which is less than  . Even so, the patient rejects r = ^ with strictly
positive probability: p (^) > 0 when  > s.
Proposition 1 says that the consultation game always possesses a PKBE
or a CE, and that the value of s determines which equilibrium exists. We
will focus on these equilibria in what follows.
In the next section we argue that the producer of drug  may be able to
use DTCA to shift s. It can do so if its advertising alters the distribution F .
Note that F reects the patients beliefs about the net benet from drug ,
and may be amenable to DTCA.12
If advertising is successful in shifting s from a value above  to a value
below  , the nature of the consultation game changes: from one with a PKBE
12The true distribution may di¤er from the patients perceived distribution. This true
distribution is known to the physician (and to the drug rm) but since the physician
observes s, it is the patients perceived distribution that is relevant for the consultation
game.
11
(but no CE) to one with a CE (but no PKBE). This change may therefore
increase the set of states in which  is recommended, as well as ensuring that
 is prescribed with positive probability in the remaining states. This is a
market stealing e¤ect, and will raise the drug rms prot.13
Note that a downward shift in s implies that the patient becomes more
optimistic about the net benet of drug : more states must be excluded
from the top end of the support of patient beliefs to maintain indi¤erence
about accepting or rejecting r = ^. E¤ective DTCA must therefore persuade
the consumer that drug quality is higher than his prior belief. Section 4 shows
that DTCA may be persuasive in equilibrium.
The following two subsections discuss alternative equilibria of the consul-
tation game, and the possibility of purifying the CE to obviate the need for
patient randomisation. They may be skipped without loss of continuity.
3.1 Alternative equilibria
The consultation game may (indeed, will) possess other equilibria, besides
the PKBE or CE. Is it reasonable to focus on just these two?
When   s the PKBE has a compelling logic. As noted previously, if
  s the physician can recommend her preferred drug in every state and
be condent that the patient will be willing to accept the recommendation
without argument. It seems natural to assume that she will do so.
We can also show:
Proposition 2 If
 cp < 1
F ()
Z 
s
s dF (s)  0 (5)
then a PKBE exists and Pareto dominates any other equilibrium.
13Whatever the true distribution over S, shifting patient perceptions (F ) such that the
equilibrium switches from a PKBE to a CE will necessarily raise expected prot, as it
(weakly) increases the probability of a  prescription in every state.
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Condition (5) implies   s and hence the existence of a PKBE. Under
the stronger condition (5), when Pareto dominance is used as an equilibrium
selection criterion, it selects the PKBE.
The Supplementary Material has further discussion of equilibria, besides
those of the PKBE form, that exist when   s but (5) does not hold.
The Supplementary Material also considers alternative equilibria (to the
CE) when  > s. It is shown that the only other state monotonic equilibria
are ones in which  is recommended and prescribed with probability 1 in
every state. We call this a Beta equilibrium (BE). Of these two types of
equilibria the CE and the BE the former better matches the empirical
evidence on the e¤ects of DTCA. Both types of equilibria imply an increase
in the prescribing of drug  relative to the PKBE (i.e., a market stealing
e¤ect), but only the CE predicts an increase in patient-doctor conict, which
is a well-known side-e¤ect of DTCA (Kravitz et al., 2003).14
3.2 Purifying equilibria
At the cost of some elaboration of the model, it is possible to dispense with
the need for patient randomisation in equilibrium.15 We will sketch the
required elaboration here, though the rest of the paper works with the non-
elaborated model for simplicity.
Suppose that patients are heterogeneous in their conict costs, with cp dis-
tributed according to a continuous distribution function G, which is strictly
increasing on its support. If the doctor cannot observe cp (but knows G)
patient responses may be stochastic from the doctors perspective even if no
patient type actually randomises.
LetH denote the distribution function for s induced by the distributionG
over conict costs.16 Consider a putative equilibrium in which there is some
14The Supplementary Material discusses the robustness of our conclusions to allowing
BE-inducing DTCA.
15Our thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility.
16Note that s > 0 when cp = 0 by Assumption 1. Moreover, s is strictly increasing in
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s 2 (0;  ] such that the doctor chooses r = ^ when s 2 [!; s) and r = ^
when s 2 (s; 1]. All patient types will accept the latter recommendation
(since s > 0). In the putative equilibrium, the doctor will expect the former
recommendation to be accepted with probability 1 H (s) (Lemma 2). The
necessary and su¢ cient condition for this putative equilibrium to exist is that
s    = H (s) (s      cd)
so that the doctor is indi¤erent about which recommendation to make in
state s (Lemma 1). This indi¤erence condition may be written
H (s) =
(   s)
(   s) + cd (6)
Since cd > 0, it is easy to see that equation (6) has a unique solution in (0;  ]:
the left-hand side increases (weakly) from H (0) = 0; the right-hand side is
strictly decreasing from a strictly positive value at s = 0 to a value of zero
at s =  . See Figure 1.
The solution to (6) generates a set of equilibria with the following common
features: the doctor recommends drug  when s 2 [!; s) and drug  when
s 2 (s; 1]; all patient types accept recommendation ^; all patients with cp
such that s in (1) exceeds (respectively, falls short of) s accept (respectively,
reject) recommendation ^. The probability of rejecting r = ^ is thus given
by (6).
With this puriedequilibrium, persuasive DTCA will shift the distrib-
ution H, which will change the solution to (6). For example, if the common
patient beliefs described by F become more optimistic about drug quality,
then s will fall for every patient type and the new H will lie to the left (rst-
order stochastically dominate) the old. From Figure 1 we observe that this
will give a lower solution for s, so there will be more states in which the
doctor recommends drug  and more patients who reject r = ^. In other
words, persuasive DTCA raises the prot of the drug rm through a market
stealing e¤ect.
cp when s < 1. It follows that the lower bound on the support of H is strictly positive,
and that H is continuous at any s < 1.
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Figure 1: Solving (6)
4 DTCA as a signal of quality
Suppose that drug  comes in n possible quality levels, indexed by q 2
f1; :::; ng, and a drug of quality q has e¢ cacy distribution F q. The quality
of drug  is ascertained through scientic evidence (i.e., RCT data). This
trial data is known to the pharmaceutical company and to the physician,17
but not to the patient.
In the consultation game, the distribution F represents the patients prior
beliefs about drug e¢ cacy. These beliefs will incorporate any information the
patient has gleaned from DTCA. In the absence of DTCA, we assume that
patients assign prior probability q 2 (0; 1) to quality q. Therefore, if DTCA
17Azoulay (2002) nds that prescribing does respond to scientic evidence on the e¢ cacy
of a drug.
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is banned, the patients beliefs are represented by
F =
nX
q=1
qF
q.
Assumption 2 For each q 2 f1; :::; ng, the distribution F q is continuous
with support [!q; 1] for some !q 2 [!; 0). It is strictly increasing on its
support and satises F (!q) = 0.
We index drugs such that lower q values imply higher quality think of
q as the drugs quality rank. We assume that drug q has a quality advantage
over drug q + 1 in the following sense:18
Assumption 3 Distribution supports satisfy
s = !n < !n 1 <    < !1
and, for every q 2 f1; 2; :::; n  1g, distribution F q strictly dominates distri-
bution F q+1 in the sense of the reverse hazard rate order. That is,
F q (s)
F q+1 (s)
is strictly increasing on (!q; 1). In particular (see Shaked and Shanthikumar,
1994, Section 1.B.6):
1
F q (z)
Z z
s
s dF q (s) >
1
F q+1 (z)
Z z
s
s dF q+1 (s) (7)
for any z 2 (!q; 1).
18Assumption 3 implies that F q rst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) F q+1, but
is stronger. We thank a referee for pointing out the need for this stronger condition.
Note that since F q (1) = F q+1 (1), we can only have F q (s) =F q+1 (s) strictly increasing
on (!q; 1) if !q+1 < !q. Hence the restriction on the supports.
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Condition (7) says that, conditional on learning s 2 [s; z], patients expect
a higher net health benet from drug  when it is of quality (rank) q than
when it is of quality (rank) q + 1.
Dening
sq = sup
(
s0 2 S

Z s0
s
(s  cp) dF q (s)  0
)
,
an immediate consequence of Assumption 3 is that sq  sq+1 for any q 2
f1; 2; :::; n  1g, with strict inequality if sq < 1.
Suppose, for example, that s1 <   s, where s is dened by (1) for
F =
Pn
q=1 qF
q. If DTCA is banned, the consultation game possesses a
PKBE (since   s) and the physician writes her favoured prescription in
every state. However, if s true quality is q = 1 and the producer of drug 
(rm ) could credibly convey this information to the patient, the PKBE
would no longer be viable (since s1 < ) and the CE may be played instead.
This would increase revenue for rm .
Suppose that rm  has an opportunity to advertise to patients prior to
patients consulting their doctors. The sequence of moves is now as follows:
1. Nature chooses the drug quality. Quality q is chosen with probability
q.
2. Firm  observes q and choses an action from A = f?; 1; 2; :::; ng, where
? denotes no advertising and a 2 f1; 2; :::; ng is an advertised claim that
q = a.19
3. Nature chooses the state s 2 S according to distribution F q (where q
is the quality chosen at stage 1).
4. The physician observes q, s and a and makes her recommendation to
the patient (r 2
n
^; ^
o
).
19We assume that the producers of  do not advertise. If drug  is a well-known, o¤-
patent medication and competitively supplied, then it is reasonable to suppose that the
producers of  have no incentive to advertise.
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5. The patient observes a and r and decides on treatment (t 2 f; g).
The payo¤s to the physician and patient are the same as in the consul-
tation game. Firm s payo¤ depends on its sales and its advertising costs.
We shall treat stages 3-5 of the game as a representativeconsultation, and
assume that rm  earns total revenue (net of production costs) equal to R if
 is prescribed at the end of the typical consultation. If action a 2 A f?g
is chosen in stage 2, the drug rm pays an additional advertising cost K > 0.
Advertisements are audited with probability  2 [0; 1] and if a 6= q, a ne
  0 is imposed.
The drug rm is risk neutral, maximising expected prot. If drug  is of
quality q and prescribed with probability  in the typical consultation, its
expected prot is
R   I [a 6= ?]K   I [a =2 f?; qg].
Consider a scenario in which the PKBE exists (and is played) when DTCA
is banned. Furthermore, suppose that s1 <  . Then DTCA may permit a
type q = 1 rm to credibly signal its quality to patients and increase sales of
its drug as follows. Suppose that patients expect the drug rm to advertise
if and only if q = 1. If no DTCA is observed, they therefore infer that q > 1
and follow the PKBE strategy in the consultation phase.20 If they observe
a = 1, they infer that q = 1. Since s1 <  the PKBE cannot exist, but the
CE (for F = F 1) does.
Are patient beliefs rational in this scenario? Let
q =
(   sq)
(   sq) + cd
denote the probability that ^ is rejected in a CE of the consultation game
with F = F q. It is optimal for a type q = 1 rm to choose a = 1 i¤
F 1 ()  (1  1)F 1 (s1)

R  K (8)
20Recall that the PKBE exists when patients know only that q  1 (DTCA is banned).
If DTCA allows them to exclude q = 1, they will be no less willing to follow the advice of a
doctor who is playing the PKBE strategy (and to accept recommendation ^ in particular).
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The left-hand side is the di¤erence between expected revenue under the CE,
which is 
1  F 1 (s1) + 1F 1 (s1)

R
and expected revenue under the PKBE, which is
1  F 1 ()R.
It is optimal for a type q = 1 rm to choose a = 1 i¤ this di¤erence is at least
as high as its advertising cost, K. Similarly, it is optimal for a type q > 1
rm not to choose a = 1 i¤
[F q ()  (1  1)F q (s1)]R  K +  (9)
Patient beliefs are therefore rational provided K is not too high so (8) is
satised  and  is high enough to ensure (9). Under these conditions,
DTCA is credible. It is also e¤ective it switches behaviour in the consul-
tation from the PKBE to the CE strategies for F = F 1, thereby increasing
sales of drug .
The following Proposition and its Corollary formalise this intuition.
Proposition 3 Suppose s1 <   s, where s is dened by (1) for F =Pn
q=1 qF
q, and further suppose that
K  F 1 ()  (1  1)F 1 (s1)R (10)
Letting
x = max
q2f2;:::;ng
[F q ()  (1  1)F q (s1)]R K
the following is an equilibrium strategy prole i¤   x:
The Drug Firm: advertises truthfully if q = 1 and does not advertise
otherwise.
The Physician: follows her PKBE strategy if a 2 f?; 2; :::; ng, recom-
mends  if a = 1 and s > s1, and recommends  otherwise.
The Patient: always accepts recommendation ^, accepts recommendation
^ if a 2 f?; 2; :::; ng, and accepts recommendation ^ with probability 1  1
if a = 1.
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Corollary 1 If
K < max
q2f2;:::;ng
[F q ()  (1  1)F q (s1)]R (11)
the equilibrium in Proposition 3 requires  > 0.
The condition s1 <   s in Proposition 3 ensures that the consultation
game possesses a PKBE when patient beliefs are given by F =
Pn
q=1 qF
q,
while if patient beliefs are F = F 1 then the CE exists but not the PKBE.
Condition (10) ensures that the highest quality drug rm is prepared to
advertise if doing so switches play from the PKBE strategies to the CE
strategies (for F = F 1) in the consultation phase.
Proposition 3 makes it clear that it is not only truth-in-advertising regu-
lation that supports the credibility of DTCA. The direct cost of advertising
also plays a role, as in Milgrom and Roberts (1986). If condition (11) in
Corollary 1 fails, then DTCA may still occur in equilibrium even if content is
unregulated. However, excluding this special case, truth-in-advertising regu-
lation is critical to the credibility of DTCA (i.e., x > 0).
Closer inspection of the equilibrium in Proposition 3 also reveals an im-
portant role for the physician in sustaining DTCA. If a = 1 and s < s1 the
doctor will try to dissuade the patient from taking drug  and will be suc-
cessful with probability 1 1. This discourages lower quality drug producers
from falsely claiming that q = 1. Assumption 3 implies that F q FOSD F q+1
for any q < n, so the doctors reluctance to prescribe  when s < s1 is more
costly for a low-quality drug producer than for a higher quality producer.
This also contributes to the credibility of DTCA.
We do not attempt a complete welfare analysis, as our model omits too
many of the market failures that complicate the picture (such as the moral
hazard e¤ects of insurance on consumer demand for pharmaceuticals). How-
ever, it is interesting to compare the payo¤s of the players in the equilibrium
of Proposition 3 relative to their payo¤s in the default scenario in which
DTCA is banned (or when  is too low to support it). In the latter scenario,
doctors and patients get their PKBE payo¤s, and the drug manufacturer gets
the expected prot from the PKBE level of prescribing.
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If the drug rm is of type q > 1 then no player is a¤ected by moving
from the default scenario to the equilibrium in Proposition 3. However, if
q = 1 then the physician is made worse o¤she no longer gets her way in the
consultation while the drug rm is (weakly) better o¤it (weakly) increases
its expected prot through the use of DTCA. The patients expected welfare
(under the true distribution F 1) changes by:Z 
s
s dF 1 (s)  (1  1)
Z s1
s
s dF 1 (s)   1F 1 (s1) cp
>
Z s1
s
s dF 1 (s)  (1  1)
Z s1
s
s dF 1 (s)   1F 1 (s1) cp
= 1F
1 (s1) cp   1F 1 (s1) cp = 0
where the inequality uses the fact that 0 < s1 <  and the rst equality uses
the denition of s1. Therefore, patients and drug manufacturers gain at the
expense of physicians (and their employers).
4.1 False DTCA
In this section we show that false advertising can also be sustained in equilib-
rium. Of course, the notion of equilibrium precludes patients being mislead.
They are aware that some DTCA may be false and form their beliefs accord-
ingly. Nevertheless, it may be protable for some types to advertise falsely
in equilibrium.
To describe such an equilibrium, it is useful to dene
s12 = sup
(
s0 2 S
 1
Z s0
s
(s  cp) dF 1 (s) + 2
Z s0
s
(s  cp) dF 2 (s)  0
)
and
12 =
(   s12)
(   s12) + cd .
If patients learn via DTCA that q 2 f1; 2g, then they form the belief
F 12 =

1
1 + 2

F 1 +

2
1 + 2

F 2.
For these beliefs, the consultation game has a CE provided  > s12 and
recommendation ^ is rejected with probability 12 in that CE.
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Proposition 4 Suppose s12 <   s and
K  F 1 ()  (1  12)F 1 (s12)R (12)
Letting
x12 = max
q2f3;:::;ng
[F q ()  (1  12)F q (s12)] K
and
x12 =

F 2 ()  (1  12)F 2 (s12)
 K
the following is an equilibrium strategy prole i¤  2 [x12; x12]:
The Drug Firm: posts advertisement a = 1 if q 2 f1; 2g and does not
advertise otherwise.
The Physician: follows her PKBE strategy if a 2 f?; 2; 3; :::; ng, recom-
mends  if a = 1 and s > s12, and recommends  otherwise.
The Patient: always accepts recommendation ^, accepts recommendation
^ if a 2 f?; 2; 3; :::; ng, and accepts recommendation ^ with probability 1 12
if a = 1.
Corollary 2 If
K < max
q2f3;:::;ng
[F q ()  (1  12)F q (s12)]R (13)
the equilibrium in Proposition 4 requires  > 0
In addition to exhibiting the possibility of false advertising in equilibrium,
Proposition 4 also illustrates the fact that the relationship between regulation
and the level of DTCA is not straightforward. If  < x12 this equilibrium
does not exist, but strengthening regulation such that  2 [x12; x12] would
create the potential for false DTCA to arise via such an equilibrium. Regula-
tion has a direct deterrent e¤ect but it may also have an indirect credibility-
enhancing e¤ect. Intermediation by the doctor cannot completely undo the
latter, given that her preferences are not perfectly aligned with the patients.
Once again, the credibility of advertising rests on both the direct adver-
tising cost K and the expected ne . Provided K is not too high, the role
of regulation is critical (Corollary 2).
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As with the equilibrium of Proposition 3, the doctor also plays an im-
portant role in supporting the credibility of DTCA. In fact, her role is even
more important here. If 12 ! 1 (e.g., if cd ! 0), the doctors attempts to
dispute DTCA are ignored by the patient and the equilibrium of Proposition
4 cannot exist. To see this, note that when 12 = 1
x12 = max
q2f3;:::;ng
[F q ()] K
and
x12 =

F 2 ()
 K.
Since F 2 () < F q () for any q > 2 (an implication of Assumption 3), we
have x12 < x12. Intuitively, the doctors ability to reduce prescribing of drug
 when s < s12 is what allows drug quality to a¤ect incentives for false
advertising: lower quality drugs su¤er more from the doctors push-back, as
they face a higher probability that s < s12. If the doctor cannot e¤ectively
dispute DTCA, then all types q > 1 have the same incentive to make the
false claim a = 1. This undermines the credibility of DTCA.
In general, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for x12  x12 is
F q ()  (1  12)F q (s12)  F 2 ()  (1  12)F 2 (s12) (14)
for all q > 2. This says that a type 2 rm experiences a weakly higher
increase in expected revenue than a type q > 2 rm, when moving from the
PKBE to the CE (for patient beliefs F 12). This means that a type 2 rm
has more incentive to send misleading DTCA than any lower quality type.
The Supplementary Material contains a simple example for which x12 < x12.
We may re-express (14) in the equivalent form:
F q ()
F 2 ()
  1

 (1  12)
F 2 (s12)
F 2 ()

F q (s12)
F 2 (s12)
  1

(15)
Recall that Assumption 3 implies
F q ()
F 2 ()
 F
q (s12)
F 2 (s12)
.
23
Since
(1  12)
F 2 (s12)
F 2 ()
 1,
condition (15) requires that the di¤erence
F q (s12)
F 2 (s12)
  F
q ()
F 2 ()
be su¢ ciently large, with the required di¤erence increasing in 12. The less
e¤ective is the push-back from the doctor (i.e., the higher is 12), the harder
it is to sustain the equilibrium in Proposition 4.
Let us compare the player payo¤s in the equilibrium of Proposition 4 to
those in a scenario in which DTCA is banned (or a scenario in which  is
too low, or too high, to support it). If q > 2, there is no e¤ect. If q 2 f1; 2g
the payo¤ to the drug rm increases and that to the doctor falls. For any
given q 2 f1; 2g, the patients expected welfare (under the true distribution
F q) changes by:Z 
s
s dF q (s)  (1  12)
Z s12
s
s dF q (s)   12F q (s12) cp (16)
relative to the scenario with no DTCA. This expression is strictly positive if
q = 1 (i.e., if DTCA conveys truthful information) sinceZ 
s
s dF 1 (s)  (1  12)
Z s12
s
s dF 1 (s)   12F 1 (s12) cp
> 12
Z s12
s
s dF 1 (s)   12F 1 (s12) cp
 12F 1 (s12) cp   12F 1 (s12) cp = 0,
where we have used the fact that s1  s12 <  . However, if q = 2 it is
possible that (16) is negative.21 Nevertheless, the patients expected welfare
21Think of a situation in which s1 is very close to  , q = 2 corresponds to a very low
quality drug (so s2 is very high) but 2= (1 + 2) is very small.
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change, conditional on the event q 2 f1; 2g, is equal to:Z 
s
s dF 12 (s)  (1  12)
Z s12
s
s dF 12 (s)   12F 12 (s12) cp
> 12
Z s12
s
s dF 12 (s)   12F 12 (s12) cp
= 12F
12 (s12) cp   12F 12 (s12) cp = 0.
Once again, patients and drug rms benet from DTCA at the expense of
doctors.
It is also straightforward to observe that x12  x, since
(1  12)F 2 (s12)  (1  1)F 2 (s1) .
It follows that if the equilibria of Propositions 3 and 4 both exist, then
x12  x12  x. In other words, higher expected nes are necessary to sustain
the equilibrium with purely truthful DTCA than to sustain the equilibrium
with false DTCA.
5 Discussion
Let us summarise our main conclusions. We consider a managed care envi-
ronment in which doctors are imperfect agents of their patients. Assuming
that patients always follow their physiciansrecommendations when DTCA
is banned (i.e., a PKBE is played), the introduction of DTCA may facilitate
market stealing. Truth-in-advertising regulation plays an important role in
supporting the credibility on which advertising relies to be e¤ective.
Of course, we have only shown the possibility, not the certainty, of a
market-stealing e¤ect of DTCA. We have not characterised all equilibria of
the model with DTCA. However, as we demonstrate in the Supplementary
Material (Proposition 5), our conclusions are robust in the following sense:
(i) whenever DTCA is observed in equilibrium,22 it always results in a strictly
higher level of prescribing of drug  than under a PKBE; and (ii) the expected
22Or rather, in a restricted equilibrium, as dened in the Supplementary Material.
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ne  must exceed a lower bound to support any equilibrium with purely
truthful advertising, and must fall between an upper and lower bound for
equilibria with both truthful and false advertising.23
Some key assumptions underpin our results. The remainder of this section
discusses these assumptions.
We assume that physicians are biased against the new drug and that pa-
tients are aware of this. As discussed in the Introduction, there is evidence
that managed care schemes place e¤ective supply-side constraints on physi-
ciansprescribing of expensive new drugs, and that patients are aware of this
pressure.
We have also implicitly assumed that physicians cannot credibly convey
information about the state s to their patients  they merely recommend
one drug or the other. Is this reasonable? Perhaps a doctor could present
test results to convince her patient that drug  is unsuitable for him? We
would argue, however, that while the test results may be veriable to the
patient, their proper interpretation is not. Specialised expertise is required
to ascertain the relability of the test and to understand the signicance of
the results.
In the model with DTCA, we assume that drug advertisements must
specify a particular quality level. This reects U.S. regulations, which require
rms to specify side-e¤ects of the drug (and, if known, what can be done to
lower the chance of experiencing them). The FDA sends out a warning
letter if it believes that information has been left out.24 Therefore, it seems
reasonable to restrict messages to precise claims about quality. One may
think, for example, of quality as a list of side-e¤ects, with q a proper subset
of q + 1. The advertisement a = q is the claim that q is a complete list
of all side-e¤ects, not a claim that the elements of q are amongst the side
e¤ects. We assume that the latter claim, which might be described by the
23Conditions for these bounds to be non-trivial may, of course, be substantive as per
Corollaries 1 and 2.
24For instance, in the case of Vitrase, it sent out a warning letter in February 2005
because its advertisements did not include crucial risk information.
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set fq; q + 1; :::; ng, is excluded by the nature of the regulations.25
The model also assumes a common ne for false advertising, irrespective
of the level of falsehood. Relaxing this assumption would, we believe, only
strengthen our results. Consider, for example, the equilibrium in Proposition
4. This relies on type q = 2 being willing to lie, but not types q > 2. If the
latter falsehoods, being more serious, were punished more heavily, this would
make the equilibrium even easier to support.
On the other hand, relaxing our assumption of a xed advertising cost
K could potentially weaken results. If rms can a¤ect this cost by choosing
di¤erent levels of advertising intensity then patients may be able to infer
quality from advertising expenditure, as in Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
DTCA might then be an e¤ective signal of quality even in the absence of
regulation, since high-quality types can separate themselves by advertising
more intensively. However, in practice, patients would be hard put to esti-
mate the amount of money spent on advertising. We believe that our model,
in which patients need only observe the fact, rather than the level, of adver-
tising is more plausible. It is also useful for illustrating how advertising can
be credible even without exploiting the intensity dimension.
We further assume that patients can observe the expected ne , and
this assumption might also be questioned. The audit probability is par-
ticularly di¢ cult to observe and need not remain constant over time. In-
deed, concerns have been raised about the declining capacity of the FDA to
properly administer DTCA regulations. For example, DTCA increased from
$985m in 1995 to $4,237m in 2005, while the number of FDA sta¤responsible
for monitoring DTCA remained static over the same period. Consequently,
the number of violation warning letters showed a marked decline (Donohue,
Cevasco and Rosenthal, 2007).
If patients have an unreasonably optimistic expectation about the FDAs
regulatory oversight there is potential for even greater patient-physician con-
25Of course, it is also interesting to consider how regulations might optimally distin-
guish between incomplete and false information, and between levels of falsehood. Either
distinction could potentially be considered within a modied version of our model.
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ict from DTCA than our model might suggest. For example, suppose pa-
tients believe that  is large enough to support the equilibrium in Propo-
sition 3 and therefore that rms have no incentive to advertise falsely. If,
in reality,  is much smaller than patientsexpectations, and low enough
to induce some low quality types to make false claims, then patients will
naïvely believe these claims. If a patient observes a false claim from a low
quality rm, it is highly likely that the physician will recommend  and be
challenged by the patient, whereas a properly informed patient would have
accepted the physicians recommendation in the same state. There will con-
sequently be higher levels of conict and higher levels of prescribing of drug
. This (albeit informal) argument suggests that imperfectly understood reg-
ulation can induce more false advertising than a publicly announced repeal
of all regulation.
Finally, our model does not include an explicit role for detailing. To
the extent that detailing only reduces the physicians bias as opposed to
making the doctor positively inclined towards the new drug our model still
supports a market-stealing e¤ect of DTCA. However, if detailing can render
doctors positively inclined to the new drug can reverse the physicians bias
then DTCA is best explained as part of a market-expanding strategy, as
in Brekke and Kuhn (2006).
6 Conclusion
The appropriate regulation of DTCA is an important policy question. The
existence of DTCA suggests that pharmaceutical rms believe it is e¤ective
in driving sales, and many detractors claim that it distorts prescribing
towards more expensive drugs. In thinking about whether and how DTCA
might inuence prescribing, one must consider how drug advertising can be
su¢ ciently credible to undermine the role of the learned intermediary
the physician.
This paper is the rst to present a signalling theory in which the credi-
bility of DTCA is endogenised. The model also helps to explain the role of
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regulation in supporting the credibility of DTCA to a cynical patient popu-
lation, and hence to sustaining the viability of advertising in equilibrium.
We do not undertake any formal welfare analysis here, so any conclusions
about the appropriate regulatory responses to DTCA can only be speculative.
Analysing the welfare e¤ects of DTCA is not straightforward (Danzon and
Keu¤el, 2014). There are a plethora of market failures, including moral
hazard in the insurance or HMO market, dynamic and static ine¢ ciency in
the market for new drugs,26 and asymmetric information in the market for
phsyician services. A welfare analysis would need to consider all these market
failures simultaneously.
Of course, if the policy concern is solely with false advertising, then one
simple solution is to set the expected ne extremely high. But one of the
lessons from our model is that marginal increments to expected nes might
have unpredictable e¤ects. The conditions for existence of equilibria with
false DTCA impose a lower as well as an upper bound on the expected
ne.
Some detractors of DTCA also worry about harm from truthful adver-
tising. They argue that the physician performs a useful service by rationing
expensive drugs so that scarce health dollars are used more e¢ ciently in an
environment with high levels of insurance coverage. If the policy aim is to re-
duce all DTCA, and an outright ban is infeasible, then complete de-regulation
could be one option to consider as a potential means of undermining the cred-
ibility of advertising.27
26By dynamic issues we mean the incentives for R&D while the static issues are about
the monopolistic pricing of drugs resulting from patent protection.
27If such an approach were to be followed, it would be important to run a public aware-
ness campaign to alert consumers to the unregulated status of DTCA recall the discussion
in Section 5.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. This follows from the fact that
E

ud (r0; t; s)  ud (r; t; s) j s = (0   ) (s  )   const:
is strictly increasing in s. (The constant is the di¤erence in expected
conict costs for the two recommendations. This di¤erence does not depend
on s.) In other words, the di¤erence in expected utility from recommending
r0 rather than r in state s is a strictly increasing function of s. 
Proof of Lemma 2. We may re-write (2) in the following equivalent form:Z s
s
s dF (s)  cpF (s) ,
Z s
s
(s  cp) dF (s)  0.
Hence, (2) implies s  s. For the converse, it su¢ ces to observe that ifZ s0
s
(s  cp) dF (s) > 0
then Z s00
s
(s  cp) dF (s) > 0
for any s00 > s0. Thus, if (2) did not hold, then s < s would necessarily
follow, given that Z s0
s
(s  cp) dF (s)
is continuous in s0. 
Proof of Proposition 1. In any responsive and state monotonic equilibrium
with s 2 (!; 1), we have d (s) = 0 when s < s, d (s) = 1 when s > s
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and both recommendations occur with strictly positive probability see the
discussion following Lemma 1. It follows that p

^

is optimal for posterior
beliefs that condition F on [s; 1], and p (^) is optimal for posterior beliefs
that condition F on [s; s]. It also follows that any PBE of this form will
satisfy the IC, since there are no o¤-equilibrium recommendations.
Figure 2 depicts the optimal patient responses as a function of s 2 (!; 1).
To construct Figure 2 we dene
s^ = inf

s0 2 S
 Z 1
s0
(s+ cp) dF (s)  0

(17)
This parameter determines the critical s value at which the patients optimal
decision switches from accepting to rejecting r = ^, as veried in the following
lemma.28
Lemma 3 Given s 2 (!; 1), the condition
1
[1  F (s)]
Z 1
s
s dF (s)   cp (18)
is equivalent to s  s^.
Condition (18) is necessary and su¢ cient for the patient to accept r = ^
when posterior beliefs are given by F conditioned on [s; 1]. Note that s^ < 0
by Assumption 1.
From Figure 2 we see that responsiveness implies s 2 [s^; s].
We may use
 = p (^) + p

^

  1 (19)
as a one-dimensional parameterisation of the optimal patient response to
each s 2 (!; 1) \ [s^; s]. To see why, note that if s 2 (!; 1) \ [s^; s] then
the patients optimal response takes one of the following mutually exclusive
forms, depending on s:
p (^) = 0 and p

^

= 1 (20)
28Lemma 3 may be proved along similar lines to Lemma 2 we leave the details to the
reader.
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Figure 2: Patient best responses
p (^) 2 (0; 1] and p

^

= 1 (21)
p (^) = 0 and p

^

2 [0; 1) (22)
It is easily checked that  determines a one-to-one mapping from the set of
scenarios described by (20)(22) into [ 1; 1].29 Scenario (20) gives  = 0;
scenarios in (21) generate  values in (0; 1]; and scenarios in (22) generate
 values in [ 1; 0).
Figure 3 re-expresses the content of Figure 2 as a mapping from s 2 [s^; s]
to  2 [ 1; 1], assuming [s^; s]  (!; 1). It depicts the patients optimal
response given the physician strategy summarised by s.
It remains to determine the values of s associated with the doctors
optimal responses to each  2 [ 1; 1]. If the optimal s lies in (!; 1), then it
coincides with the state at which the doctor is indi¤erent about which drug
to recommend:
p (^) (s      cd) = p

^

(s   ) 
h
1  p

^
i
cd
29It is onto if (!; 1) \ [s^; s] = [s^; s].
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Figure 3: Patient best response (re-parameterised)
, s =  +
24 
p (^)  p

^

35 cd
Observe from (20) and (21) that
p (^)  p

^

=   1
when  2 [0; 1], and from (22) that
p (^)  p

^

=    1
when  2 [ 1; 0). Hence, for any scenario in (20)(22), we have
s =  +


jj   1

cd (23)
Figures 4 and 5 plot the physician response function (23) together with
the patient response function from Figure 3, for the cases   s and  > s
respectively.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium when   s
In each case, there is a unique equilibrium pair (s;). When   s this
pair is ( ; 0). Since  2 (!; 1), this pair induces a PKBE.
When  > s the equilibrium pair is
s;
(   s)
(   s) + cd

.
Since s = s 2 (0; )  (!; 1), this pair induces a CE. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Condition (5) implies   s, so a PKBE exists
(Proposition 1).
It remains to show that the PKBE Pareto dominates any other equilib-
rium under condition (5). Rather than enumerate all equilibria, we proceed
indirectly. We will divide (putative) equilibria into two classes possibly
empty and show that, for each class, any member must be Pareto domi-
nated by the PKBE.
We classify equilibria as follows:
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Figure 5: Equilibrium when  > s
Case I: Equilibria in which only one recommendation is made with
positive probability.
In such an equilibrium (if one exists), the sole equilibrium recommenda-
tion is made with probability 1 in every state. The patients treatment
lottery is therefore the same in every state. Since  < 1, it follows that
the physician is strictly worse o¤ in any Case I equilibrium than in the
PKBE. The physician obtains her favourite treatment in every state
under the PKBE, and  < 1 implies that this favourite treatment is
 in some states and  in others. An equilibrium in which the same
treatment lottery occurs in every state must be strictly worse.
What about the patient? The patients expected payo¤ under the
PKBE is Z 1

s dF (s)
Denote this payo¤ by . Since  < 1, we have  > 0 from Assumption
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1. Condition (5) implies
 
Z 1
s
s dF (s) ,
so
  max

0;
Z 1
s
s dF (s)

(24)
In a Case I equilibrium, the patient learns nothing from the doctors
equilibrium recommendation, so his expected equilibrium payo¤ is no
higher than that from receiving his ex ante optimal treatment in all
states without conict. If he receives  in all states, his expected payo¤
is zero. If he receives  in all states, his expected payo¤ isZ 1
s
s dF (s) .
We therefore deduce from (24) that the patients PKBE payo¤ is at
least as high as his payo¤ in any Case I equilibrium.
It follows that the PKBE Pareto dominates any Case I equilibrium.
Case II. Equilibria in which both recommendations are made with
positive probability.
We restrict attention to Case II equilibria which are responsive oth-
erwise the welfare analysis is the same as for Case I. By Lemma 1,
there exists some s with F (s) 2 (0; 1) such that recommendation r
is made in states s < s, to which the patient responds by choosing 
with probability p (r) = , and recommendation r0 is made in states
s > s, to which the patient responds by choosing  with probability
p (r0) = 0 > . Unless this equilibrium coincides with the PKBE
(i.e., s =  , r = ^, r0 = ^,  = 0 and 0 = 1), the physician is strictly
worse o¤ than under the PKBE.30 Once again, it su¢ ces to show that
the patient is no better o¤.
30More precisely, since  2 (0; 1), there must be a non-degenerate interval of states
around  in which the physician is strictly worse o¤. By Assumption 1, there is strictly
positive ex ante probability of s falling within this interval.
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Consider the patients expected payo¤ in such an equilibrium (i.e., a
responsive Case II equilibrium). We will show that this payo¤ is no
greater than .
If 0 < 1, it is optimal for the patient to choose t =  in response to
either recommendation. It follows that her equilibrium expected payo¤
is no better than the payo¤ from receiving treatment  in every state
without conict. The latter payo¤ is zero, which is no greater than 
recall (24).
Suppose, then, that 0 = 1. That is, the patient chooses  in response
to recommendation r0.
If r0 = ^ (hence r = ^), then either the equilibrium coincides with the
PKBE or else  > 0. (If  = 0 the physicians optimal strategy implies
s =  , so we have a PKBE.) If  > 0, it is optimal for the patient to
choose t =  in response to either recommendation. It follows that his
equilibrium payo¤ is no greater than if he were to receive treatment 
in every state without conict. From Case I, we already know that 
is at least as high as this see (24) again.
Finally, consider equilibria with r0 = ^ (hence r = ^).
If  = 0 in such an equilibrium, then optimal physician behaviour
implies s =  both recommendations provoke conict, so the doctor
recommends the one that results in her favoured treatment. In such
an equilibrium (if it exists) the patient receives the same treatment as
under the PKBE, but there is conict with probability 1. The patient
is clearly worse o¤ in such an equilibrium than under the PKBE.
Finally, we show that an equilibrium with r0 = ^ and  2 (0; 1) is
precluded by condition (5). For such an equilibrium to exist, it is
necessary that Z s
s
s dF (s) =  F (s) cp (25)
to ensure the patient is willing to randomise following recommendation
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^. Since 0 = 1, optimal physician behaviour implies that s satises
s      cd =  (s   )  (1  ) cd
, s =  +


1  

cd
In particular, s   so (25) contradicts (5).
Thus, in any Case II equilibrium consistent with (5), the patient is no
better o¤ than under the PKBE.
Cases I and II exhaust all possibilities. In summary, we have shown that
when condition (5) holds, any non-PKBE equilibrium is Pareto dominated
by the PKBE. In particular, the doctor is strictly better o¤ and the patient
no worse o¤. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The following Lemma will be useful in the sequel:
Lemma 4 If F^ =
P
q2Q qF
q for some set Q  f1; 2; :::; ng and some con-
stants q 2 (0; 1] satisfying
P
q2Q q = 1, then for any t > 0
1
F q (t)
Z t
s
s dF q (s)  1
F^ (t)
Z t
s
s dF^ (s)  1
F q (t)
Z t
s
s dF q (s)
where q = minQ and q = maxQ.
Proof. We may write
1
F^ (t)
Z t
s
s dF^ (s) =
nX
q=1
 
qF
q (t)
F^ (t)
!
1
F q (t)
Z t
s
s dF q (s)

(26)
Since F^ (t) =
Pn
q=1 qF
q (t), the right-hand side of (26) is a convex combi-
nation of the conditional means
1
F q (t)
Z t
s
s dF q (s) .
The result now follows by Assumption 3. 
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Consider the beliefs of the patient in the (putative) equilibrium, following
the drug rms move. If he observes a = 1, he uses BayesRule to form the
belief F 1. The continuation strategies of the doctor and patient  which
are those of the CE for F = F 1 are therefore sequentially rational, since
s1 <  (Proposition 1). If the patient observes a = ?, he uses BayesRule
to form the belief
F =

1
1  1
 nX
q=2
qF
q
This belief is more pessimisticthan the prior, since only the highest quality
drug rm has been excluded. More precisely, letting F^ =
Pn
q=1 qF
q, Lemma
4 implies31
1
F ()
Z 
s
s dF (s)  1
F^ ()
Z 
s
s dF^ (s) .
Since   s (i.e., the consultation game possesses a PKBE based on the prior
beliefs), we have
1
F ()
Z 
s
s dF (s)  cp
so the continuation strategies of the doctor and patient  which are those
of the PKBE are sequentially rational (Proposition 1).
If the patient observes a 2 f2; :::; ng, he cannot use BayesRule to form
beliefs. We shall suppose that the patient forms the belief F n in these cir-
cumstances (but continues to believe that the physician will play according
to the equilibrium strategies). Note that a drug rm of type q = n could
31This follows from the observation that F^ = 1F 1 + (1  1)F . We may therefore
write
1
F^ ()
Z 
s
s dF^ (s) =
1F
1 ()
F^ ()

1
F 1 ()
Z 
s
s dF 1 (s)

+
(1  1)F ()
F^ ()

1
F ()
Z 
s
s dF (s)

Moreover:
1
F ()
Z 
s
s dF (s)  1
F 2 ()
Z 
s
s dF 2 (s) <
1
F 1 ()
Z 
s
s dF 1 (s)
where the rst inequality uses Lemma 4 and the second uses Assumption 3. The condi-
tional mean of F is therefore lower than that of F^ .
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conceivably benet from such a deviation, since K < R by condition (10). It
follows that these o¤-equilibrium beliefs satisfy the IC. Given these patient
beliefs, the PKBE strategies are sequentially rational by Proposition 1, since
we deduce   sn from   s and Lemma 4.
It remains to check that the drug rms strategy is optimal. The drug rm
can either choose a = 1 and induce the CE continuation (for patient beliefs
F = F 1), or choose a 2 f?; 2; :::; ng and induce the PKBE continuation.
Since advertising is costly, it is clear that the optimal choice must be a = 1
or a = ?. We must show that type q = 1 (weakly) prefers a = 1 while type
q > 1 (weakly) prefers a = ?.
As per the discussion prior to Proposition 3, it is optimal for type q = 1
to choose a = 1 i¤ 
F 1 ()  (1  1)F 1 (s1)

R  K
which is satised by assumption (10). It is optimal for type q > 1 to choose
a = ? i¤
  [F q ()  (1  1)F q (s1)]R K (27)
Therefore, we have an equilibrium i¤   x. 
Proof of Corollary 1. The right-hand side of (27) strictly exceeds zero for
some q > 1 i¤ (11). 
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows similar lines to that of Propo-
sition 3.
A patient who observes a = 1 forms belief
F 12 =

1
1 + 2

F 1 +

2
1 + 2

F 2.
Since s12 <  it is sequentially rational for the doctor and patient to play
the CE strategies (for belief F 12) in the consultation phase. A patient who
observes a = ?, forms the belief 
1Pn
q0=3 q0
!
nX
q=3
qF
q.
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Using Lemma 4 and the fact that   s, we deduce (by analogous reasoning
to that in the proof of Proposition 3) that it is sequentially rational for the
doctor and patient to play the PKBE strategies in the consultation phase.
Finally, we may assume that a patient who observes the o¤-equilibrium adver-
tisement a 2 f2; :::; ng forms the belief F n. Since K < R by condition (12),
these beliefs satisfy the IC. Given these patient beliefs, the PKBE strategies
are sequentially rational, since   sn can be deduced from Lemma 4 and
the fact that   s.
We next verify that the drug rms strategy is optimal. By familiar
reasoning, each type of drug rm will either choose a = 1 or a = ?. We
must show that types q 2 f1; 2g weakly prefer a = 1 and all other types
weakly prefer a = ?.
A type q = 1 rm weakly prefers a = 1 i¤
K  F 1 ()  (1  12)F 1 (s12)R,
which is condition (12). A type q = 2 rm weakly prefers a = 1 i¤
  F 2 ()  (1  12)F 2 (s12)R K = x12.
Similarly, a type q > 2 rm weakly prefers a = ? i¤
  [F q ()  (1  12)F q (s12)]R K.
Thus, the equilibrium exists i¤ x12    x12. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Condition (13) is equivalent to x12 > 0. 
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